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# China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 19/81)



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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS  
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

METHODS OF STUDYING COMBAT TACTICS DISCUSSED

Readers' Exchange of Ideas

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 26 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by the editorial group of "Studying Military Affairs: "Everyone Talks About Combat Methods"]

[Text] In response to readers' demands, with this issue we have started to publish a broad exchange of academic thought and research achievements according to the guideline of "a hundred schools contend" and using the method of letting the masses think of plans and letting everyone talk about combat methods aimed at problems in tactical training of the troops and in the military schools that are debated in order to enliven academic research, improve the level of tactical thinking and adapt better to the needs of war against aggression under modern conditions.

The concrete method is: 1) to selectively publish articles on combat methods which represent several different opinions on a situation which has been thought out, 2) to publish a representative article giving a brief summary of the trends after a definite period of discussion; 3) to invite the broad number of readers to evaluate and select the best plan for each situation thought out and to give encouragement.

We sincerely welcome all readers to reveal their thoughts on each situation and to participate in the discussion. The situations brought up should reflect a relatively important and concrete problem that is being debated in the tactical realm; they should be simple and clear, and diagrams showing the situation should accompany the articles. Articles of discussion will not be limited in length, personal opinions can be expressed and a contention regarding a certain viewpoint and a certain article can be expressed. The viewpoints should be clear and arguments and reasons should be presented to explore the problems patiently. Articles submitted should include the code name of the units and the writer's duty and should be mailed directly to the editorial group of "Studying Military Affairs."

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Tactical Problem

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 26 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by He Xingwen [6320 5281 2429] and Liang Tongzhan [2733 0681 2069] of the infantry school of the Beijing units: "In This Situation, Should the Firing Positions Be Occupied?"]

[Text] The 1st Company of the Red Army infantry has attached to it the 85-mm cannon, the 82-mm mortar and heavy machineguns. As established by the higher authorities, it occupies a fortified defense position. The 1st Company has constructed an antitank network position of trenches over 200 meters deep in front of the No 1 and No 3 positions, and it has set up several antitank groups. In front of the forward defense position are a mixture of minefields, iron wire mesh, cliffs and antitank trenches, forming an obstacle zone with a depth reaching 400 meters. The topography in front of the forward position is flat and open, favorable for the mobilization of tanks and armored vehicles of the Blue Army.

The attacking force of the Blue Army is a strengthened motorized infantry battalion. After 30 minutes of firing preparation, two openings 8 meters wide have been opened up in the Red Army's obstacle zone. Tanks and infantry combat vehicles of the first combat front begin to pass through the opening and launch an assault on the Red Army. The tanks, infantry combat vehicles and self-propelled artillery of the second and third frontlines follow 200 meters and 400 meters behind the first combat front respectively and fire at the Red Army during the course of forward advance. At this time, the artillery continues to fire at the forward positions of the Red Army.

In this situation, should the Red Army hiding in the fortifications occupy the firing positions?

Bridging Gap in Training Combat

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 26 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Yin Li [1438 4539], instructor of the military academy: "How To Study Academic Problems in Planned Training"]

[Text] Planned training is a good method used to train and improve the organizational and commanding capabilities and tactical skills of the commander. Of course, people also often call it "paper war," indicating that planned training is different from real war. How can we lessen this gap in the academic research of planned training? I will talk about my personal experience.

We must conscientiously study the enemy. At present in planned training, because of insufficient study of the enemy, we frequently assume victory in every battle while the enemy can never shake us. Even the atomic bomb seems to be as easily handled as a hand grenade. In the future, our main war opponent will be a highly modernized and fierce enemy whose weapons and equipment, establishment, system and tactical thinking will all be different from past enemies. This requires us to adapt to this new situation so that the assumptions in the imagined situation coincide with the combat characteristics and the tactical thinking of the war opponent and so that everything starts out from the actual situation of the enemy. Only in this way can we start out from the difficult and follow the strict situation, so that the strict situation is rational and the difficulties are feasible.

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We must start out from our present equipment. The study of tactical problems in planned training is inseparable from the weapons and equipment of the two sides. At present, the tactical principles of the armies of the advanced capitalist countries of the West are determined by their weapons, technology and equipment. If we follow the West, mainly using antitank guided missiles and surface-to-air guided missiles to attack tanks and airplanes, then no matter how good the tactics are, it will still be "empty talk versus empty talk." For a relatively long period in the future, in weapons and equipment we will still be inferior to the superior enemy. We must never improperly belittle ourselves; we must fully develop man's subjective mobility, start out from the presently available equipment our armed forces possess, consider the possible developments within the near future, and develop a set of practical, feasible, flexible and mobile tactics. Only in this way can our planned training be established on a reliable material foundation and the tactical thinking thus developed adapt to the needs of future war against aggression.

We must solve the problem of combination in a key way. Improving the commanding capabilities and the tactical level of the commander of combined forces to organize joint combat of various troops and special troops under modern conditions is the fundamental goal of planned training. Therefore, in the course of developing academic study, we must grasp this key from beginning to end.

We must pay attention to allowing the facts to speak for themselves. When studying and exploring tactical problems in planned training, we must emphasize utilization of the experience gained in exercises, experimental data and related combat cases and allow them to speak for themselves. We must talk rationally according to facts; we must not start out from and discuss empty concepts. Yet, planned training means the study of a certain academic problem under specific and concrete conditions; the experience of exercises, experimental data and related combat cases drawn upon when exploring the problem are all unavoidably limited. This requires that in our thinking we strictly follow the method of going from the specific to the general and from the concrete to the abstract when studying academic problems in planned training, thus elevating sensory understanding to rational understanding.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PLA UNITS FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE TRAINING

Drilling According to Needs

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Liu Qingyan [0491 1987 1750] and Shi Wenting [0670 2429 0080]: "Ideology Is Not Relaxed, Energy Is Not Low, The Spirit of Work Is Not Reduced; a Certain Tank Regiment Grasped the End of Training Like It Grasped the Beginning"]

[Text] It is the end of the year; on the exercise field of a certain tank regiment of the Fuzhou units, the scene is one of activity.

By now, most of the companies of this regiment have completed all of the annual training courses, and exams in tactical techniques and specialization have ended. But the leading organ of this regiment has gone down to study each company, and the energy has not lessened, the spirit of work has not dropped, and the end of training is being grasped like the beginning of training at the start of the year.

When training began, the commanding, political and logistical organs of the regiment separately organized and dispatched four working groups to help the companies solve the difficulties in training. After each company completed the annual training tasks, none withdrew and none relaxed the work assigned. Several major leaders of the regiment took the responsibility of teaching the training subjects separately and obtained good results, and they are now continuing to carry out inspection of each subject.

The entire regiment, from top to bottom, analyzed the trend in training, and separately handled the following three situations: Subjects in which training had been good and in which experience had been gained were summarized one by one. Over 10 training methods, including the training method of "one continuous line" of tactical techniques and the combined teaching method of the three levels of the regiment, the battalion and the company, were summarized one after the other, the coordinated training of the various arms of the services was emphasized. Activities were launched to seek the cause of failures in subjects that had been found during inspection and examination on a mass basis in order to think of ways to solve the problems together. The subjects which were taught in a hurry in order to catch up with the annual schedule were repeated in training. The 2d Tank Company, which was in charge of this year's exercises and construction tasks, began training 2 months later than other units. Some training subjects were rushed through. Recently, "files" were established on the training content that was rushed through, and subjects are now being "reprocessed" to eliminate the obstacles in the specialized communications units, theory of tank maneuvers and ranging by the first gunner.

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This regiment has also organized forces to strengthen the special technical backbone teams of over 10 companies by reaching out and lining up the technical backbone and instructor teams of the company, and is holding military technical training classes for various special troops and personnel and is organizing centralized training for the backbone members.

Flexibility in Training

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Jiang Yong [5592 0516] and Zheng Jian [6774 0256]: "Not 'Rehashing' Because of Regulations, Not Rushing Through To Catch Up With the Schedule: the 9th Company in Charge of Production Tasks Uses Initiative in Training and Obtains Best Achievements in the Regiment"]

[Text] The only company of a certain tank regiment of the Kunming units involved in production, the 9th Company, achieved the best scores in the yearend, training exams in single-gun live-ammunition direct-aim firing in fixed and mobile target practice and single soldier exams. This unexpected situation benefited the leaders of this regiment and taught the leaders that training should not be carried out by "arbitrary uniformity," but that the companies and units should be given a definite framework.

Last September, the party committee of this regiment ordered the 9th Company to take up the task of production, proposing that the 9th Company's training time be half that of companies receiving full training. Starting at the beginning of this year, the regimental leaders and offices did not control the training of the 9th Company very tightly; the training schedule established by the battalion was not issued to the 9th Company, allowing the 9th Company to organize and implement training on its own on the basis of the general training subjects. The cadres of the 9th Company concentrated on training. Starting out from the actual situation, training was arranged in a flexible manner. When it was seen that training in certain subjects had met the requirements, the time was reduced and the company turned to new training subjects. Training that did not satisfy the requirements was given more time. In past year, individual gunnery training generally required 2 months. This year, after 20 days of training, the requirements of the training guidelines were completely satisfied, and the company turned to new training subjects. After the pointers completed the course of corrections in firing, they were examined in marksmanship using rifles as a substitute for cannons, and this showed that many comrades did not completely grasp the main points. The company rearranged the time in order to provide for supplementary classes. The cadres of the company units organized training, emphasized quality, and did not take the training time as the main criteria. They urged that cadres and soldiers be trained strictly, and nobody was seen standing around in the fields. The soldiers did not "rehash" old exercises because of the training schedule and they did not walk through the exercises in order to catch up with the schedule; the whole company carried out training concretely.

The willow becomes a shade tree without any intention of becoming so when planted. The situation of the 9th Company brought some profound realizations to the leaders of the regiment, and regimental commander Li Defu [7812 1779 1381] said: This case fully shows that the initiative in training should definitely be given to the companies



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and units. The general training content, training standards, and training period must be uniformly established, but the training in individual subjects generally can start out from the actual situation of the companies and units and be organized and implemented in a flexible manner. Controlling training too tightly is unfavorable to mobilizing the enthusiasm of the companies and units. The leaders of this regiment plan to utilize this experience in the future training of the whole regimen..

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

COMBINED ARMS BATTALION CONDUCTS TRIAL TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Yang Songlin [2799 2646 2651]: "Change the Situation in Which the 'Vehicles, Horses, and Artillery' Do Not Meet; Explore Problems in Coordinated Training of Various Arms of the Services; A Certain Armed Force Begins Training for the Trial 'Combined Battalion'; Cadres and Soldiers Say Happily: This is Truly Like Studying Combat Under Modern Conditions"]

[Text] Editor's Note: The news about a certain armed force that has established a trial "combined battalion" to gain experience in coordinated training of various arms of the services is encouraging. This type of "combined battalion" cannot be found in the current list of established units and it has not been seen in documents of the higher authorities. But custom has been broken and such a unit has appeared in the mighty Taihangshan foothills. It vividly shows the extreme importance of implementing the spirit of the party Third Plenum, insisting on liberating thinking, and insisting on seeking truth from facts. It can be concluded that if there had been no departure from inflexible thinking, if we had not possessed a spirit of brave practice and daring to create new things, if we had not had the energy to do things in a big way and been responsible for winning future wars, if we had insisted on "book worship" in doing everything and had maintained the spiritual attitude of not doing anything that was not documented and specified, this type of "combined battalion" would never have emerged.

Our armed forces, from top to bottom, lack experience in coordinated training of various arms of the services. This requires us to be brave in practice and to explore daringly. This type of "combined battalion" is a kind of brave test of coordinated training of various arms of the services. Although the experiment has just begun, the spirit of creativity manifested by the leaders of this certain armed force and the officers and men of the "combined battalion" during the course of taking the first step is worth learning. It is believed that the leaders of this certain armed force and the officers and men of the "combined battalion" will

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surely create a new road in coordinated training of various arms of the services through continuous practice and continuous summarizing of the experience. We look forward to new information about this "combined battalion."

One day during the first 10 days of August, flocks of wild chickens flew out of a certain valley in the foothills of Taihangshan as if frightened. From their normally quiet habitat began the sounds of moving tanks, artillery, radio communications, and soldiers drilling. This was the "combined battalion," which includes six arms of the services and special squads created on a trial basis by a certain arm of the military service.

For a long time, the coordinated training of military units has been a weak link. Because of the limitations of the establishment, equipment and fields, each arm of the service trained on its own, and at most, a combined training session was conducted by the military division at yearend, and the combined training for the year would be completed. Soldiers said: "The 'vehicles, horses and artillery' do not meet all year, but at yearend they come for a 'reunion dinner', and after New Year, each 'does its own thing' again!"

How can we change this situation and improve coordinated training of the various arms of the military service? After the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, during the course of shifting the emphasis of work, the leading comrades of this military force continued to think about this problem. The war of self-defense and retaliation against Vietnam made them see more clearly the extreme importance of coordinated combat by various arms of the services in modern warfare. They went to the divisions and the regiments and conscientiously studied together with the cadres and soldiers. After conducting surveys, in July, the military and party committees developed a daring idea: organize and establish a "combined battalion" including an infantry battalion, a tank company, a 122-mm howitzer company, an 82-mm recoilless cannon company, an antiaircraft machinegun company, an engineer platoon, a communications platoon, an anti-chemical-warfare platoon, a flamethrower platoon and corresponding logistics squads. Through this battalion, cadres and soldiers of various arms and special squads lived together, trained together, studied the various difficulties encountered in coordinated training of the battalion and company, explored various questions related to the organization and command of the combined army in combat to find ways and gain experience in coordinated training for the large units. The training period was 4 months. This idea was approved and enthusiastically supported by the higher leading offices.

To find a training ground for this "combined battalion" where the topographical characteristics of areas of future war could be found and which was suitable for studying the needs of the various arms of the service in coordinated training, troop commander Cao Puchi [2180 2975 1062] took a map and led his general staff to the heartland of Taihangshan to conduct surveys and select relatively ideal training grounds for each separate unit of the "combined battalion." During the first 10 days of August, each unit was deployed and stationed at the training grounds, and the "combined battalion" officially began training.

During the first stage of training, they mainly engaged in theoretical study to lay a technical and tactical foundation for coordinated training. The leaders of the "combined battalion" organized cadres above the platoon level and concentrated studies

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on the general principles of combat of the combined army, studied the basic principles of combined combat by units of the Soviet, American and Japanese armies, analyzed three typical combat cases of coordinated combat of our infantry, artillery and tanks in the war of self-defense and retaliation against Vietnam, studied the technical and tactical functions of the weapons and equipment of the specialized units of each arm of the services and the principle of using each arm of the services. The cadres stood around cannons, climbed into tanks and knelt beside antiaircraft machineguns; they listened to the "experts" of each arm of the service explaining the performance of each type of weapon and personally drove and operated the weapons. In the past, these cadres had gained their knowledge of each arm of the services by going from book to book, from figure to figure; now they learn by going from books to the real objects, from theory to practice. Everyone listened and observed, touched the real objects and carried out real practice, and they learned with great interest. After more than 10 days of study, they generally understood the performance three to five kinds of weapons other than those used in their own arm of military service; they knew how to operate and how to utilize them in combat.

During this stage, the infantry completed tactical training from single soldier attack to platoon attack. The artillery and armored troops carried out tactical training on a single cannon and a single tank. Each special squad carried out applied training in a tactical background.

"The combined battalion" also arranged three later training stages: The second stage was to study and solve problems in coordination during each combat phase and each combat period in battalion and company attack and defense, mainly by seeking a concrete method of coordinating the infantry, artillery and tanks. The third stage was to carry out continuous exercises in attack and defense tactics and to solve the problems of coordinated maneuvers under various complex conditions. The fourth stage was to conduct combined exercises with live ammunition and real people in order to examine the results of combined training. The commanders of each level above the regiment were organized to come to the exercise fields to study and solve the major difficulties in organizing and commanding coordinated combat by combining theory with actual progress and to summarize experience and lessons.

The emergence of the "combined battalion" has caused strong reactions in this military force. Battalion commander Xie Aifeng [6200 1947 1496] said happily: "In the past, each year at yearend there was combined training, but because of the short period of only a few days, the various arms of the services met superficially and 'did not care about the three aspects': they did not care about ideology, they did not care about life, and they did not care about the usual training. Combined training always seemed like the men were being 'forced' together. Now it is very different: the infantry and many special troops and squads live and eat together for a longer period, they work and enjoy recreation together, they become familiar with each other; I think of how to cooperate with you wholeheartedly and you think of how to cooperate with me wholeheartedly; this is true 'combination'." This time the 7th Artillery Company and the 3d Infantry Company lived in the same village, they "hung around" together every day, they helped each other learn, and carried out mental exercises in "how the tanks should coordinated with the infantry in combat, how the infantry should coordinate with the tanks in combat" beforehand, and preliminarily explored how tanks should coordinate with the infantry and how the infantry should open roads for the tanks, how the tanks should lead the infantry in an assault, how the infantry should cover the tanks' assault, how the tanks should support the infantry's assault at their

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original positions, how the single tank and the infantry platoon should coordinate when the infantry and tanks are at the same frontline in an assault, and similar problems. They thought about the questions and went to the driving grounds to carry out actual practice. Many problems that were thought at first to be very difficult were quickly solved in practice in the field. Soldiers said happily: The coordinated training of the various arms of the service has changed from "talking about it" to "grasping it in the hand"; we have changed from "storytelling accompanied by music" to "playing the piano." This is truly like studying combat under modern conditions!

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STATUS OF COMBINED ARMS TRAINING PROGRAM DISCUSSED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by correspondent Wang Yuzhen [3769 1342 2182] and reporter Li Qike [2621 0796 4430]: "The Present and Future of the Combined Training Program--Notes on Investigative Studies by a Certain Division of the Wuhan Troops"]

[Text] This year, under the guidance of the higher leadership organs of a certain division of the Wuhan troops, a trial training program involving combined branches of the armed services in coordinated combat was carried out. What was the most profound experience of this year's combined training? It was concluded that without reforming the training plan, combined training could not be carried out.

The Start Was Not Kicked Off Well

In March of this year, the higher leadership organs assigned this division the task of conducting coordinated combat training on a trial basis under the subject of strengthening assault combat in the army division. The whole division was enthusiastic. But when they began the annual training plans for each service arm, they became worried. The annual training plan for each service branch was separately established, the progress was mixed and not uniform, so combined training could not be considered. For example, the armored troops training plan called for basic training from March to June, applications training from July to September, tactical training in October and November (not specifying whether this included the participation of other service branches in combined training), and examination and retraining in December. Slightly different from the armored troops was the fact that some service branches did include some time for combined training with other service branches in the plans, but it was like the saying, "not meeting for a whole year, and at year end, everyone gathers for a big meal."

In addition, with the training stages drawn up by each service branch, they were not suitable for combined training. For example, in September, the infantry began offensive and defensive tactical training of the battalion, and according to the demands of combined training, the regimental artillery squad, the communications squad and the engineer platoon should be attached. But at that time the specialized technical training of the artillery squad had not been completed, the communications squad was still studying basic techniques and some

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applied subjects, and the engineer squad was busy with its own specialized training. As a result, the desire to carry out combined training on a trial basis faced difficulties from the start. So how should the first efforts begin?

## There Was a Key To Open the Lock

The current training plan became the "lock" that affected combined training. Having this lock, a key to open it should be found. This division carried out major readjustment of the training plan under the guidance of the higher leadership organs.

Readjustment of the training plan involved reforming the time of training, the content of training, the method of training, and the examination system. Leading comrades believed that as it is beneficial to combined training, readjustment should be carried out with a free hand. They followed the principle of favoring combined training and considering the characteristics of each service branch and carried out the following work:

The proportions of time allotted for military, political and cultural training of all branches of the armed services were unified. According to the original plan, the proportion of time allotted for military, political and cultural training of the infantry squads and the squads of special troops was not uniform; the former was 5.5:3.5:1, the latter was 7:2:1. They decided that the political caliber of the cadres and soldiers of the various branches of the service was generally similar, so the time for political education could be standardized. Thus, they unified the proportion of time allotted for military, political and cultural training of the various arms of the service to become 7:2:1.

The division of training stages was unified. While taking into consideration the progress of training of each service branch as a prerequisite, training was provided first for small units and then for large units in a developing order of combining training gradually. Training of the various service branches for the whole year was uniformly divided into three stages: The first stage was from March to July, mainly completing the technical and tactical subjects for units below the squad. The second stage was from August to the first 10 days of October, mainly completing the tactical training for the platoon, company and battalion and field operations of communications equipment led by commanders and commanding officers of divisions and regiments. The third period was from the middle 10 days of October to the middle 10 days of November for combined training of the regiments and divisions. During the course of implementation by each service branch, "arbitrary uniformity" was not carried out and a definite leeway was allowed.

The content of training was readjusted and time was utilized scientifically. To suit the needs of combined training, some subjects were added in the basic training of each service branch. The infantry's motorized squad mainly added general knowledge and general principles of coordinated maneuvers in coordinated combat with the various service branches mutually suitable at the same level. The special squads mainly added subjects of coordinated basic training of the service branches related to the special squads. Each service branch also enlarged

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the proportion of special tactical training: the infantry added 10 to 15 percent, the special squads added 10 percent. With such additional subjects added, where would the time come from? This division used the method of "accounting and digging for potential" to solve the problem of time, and the rest could all be included in the time for morning drill and afterclass hours. There were also some subjects such as military topography, point location and squad and group installations of wired equipment of the communications squad which were closely related, and they could be completely combined for alternate training.

## Plan Approved by Practice

What was the result of implementing such training plans after readjustment? After 1 year of combined training practice, looking back over the plan established at the beginning of the year, they found that the first step was the most difficult, but after taking the first step, "the road" was opened up.

The greatest benefit of this plan was that it "legally" established combined training so that each service branch had a basis and a criteria for grasping combined training. Because the plan provided time for combined training and subjects of combined training from beginning to end, this prompted the various service branches to consciously do a good job of their own training and to study for the goal of combining with others. Because combined training started from the small units and progressed to the larger units, from the lower echelons to the higher echelons, and was carried out in stages, the foundation was established more solidly, so that when carrying out a higher level of combined maneuvers, things fell into place and everything was kept in step.

Will the readjustment of the training plan lower the caliber of training of the special troops? At the beginning of the year, the special squads had some doubts, but at year end, they reviewed the specialized technical and tactical training scores of the various service branches and found the scores generally were higher than in past years. The comprehensive grades for the whole year showed the following statistically:

Infantry (including all infantry companies of the whole division; the same in the following): The final scores for the light weapons and the 40 mm rocket launcher and the 60 mm cannon live ammunition practice were all superior.

Artillery: Single cannon live ammunition practice and company and battalion live ammunition practice all scored well.

Armored troops (army tank regiment): Total score of the examination on theoretical subjects was good. Total scores of trainers marksmanship, combat shooting and driving examinations were all superior.

Scores of engineering squads, communications squads and anti-chemical warfare squads were all better than good. Common subjects of the various armed forces such as military physical education and formation all met the standards established by the higher authorities.



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Looking at the training achievements of the entire division, people said happily: this combined training plan has already been approved by practice.

#### A Few Words in Addition to the "Plan"

This division started out readjusting the training plan and completed the task of combined training on a trial basis as ordered by the higher authorities. Reviewing this practice, they believe that there is something more to say.

1. Reforming the training plan was the key in carrying out combined training. Yet this would not have come about if we had relied only upon the lower echelon troops. The main reason this division could readjust the training plan according to the needs of combined training was that the higher echelon leading organs grasped the situation, and there were people who provided support. Without this, no one would have dared to "do anything." No doubt some comrades who have seen the exercise by this division have said: "Their experience is good, but we cannot learn it." This shows that strengthening combined training requires that the leadership organs at each level first uniformly readjust the training plan to create conditions for the troops to carry out combined training.

2. When talking about combined training, some comrades have said: we have "innate deficiencies and acquired imbalances." What is meant by "innate deficiencies" is that the establishment and the system of our army now do not fit the demands of a combined army in many aspects. The military training department and the departments of the other branches of the service have a parallel relationship, not a subordinate relationship, the military training department is even further related to the services. As reflected in the training plan, these departments cannot be "combined" even from the top. What is meant by "acquired imbalances" is that under the current establishment and system, the various branches of the armed services has not taken active measures to strengthen their mutual relationship. Whether in establishing training plans or in doing ordinary work, all orders are passed on from top to bottom, there is only a "vertical" relationship, there is no "horizontal" relationship. It is very difficult to carry out combined training in this situation. Therefore, reform of the establishment and the system must be carried out. Before the reform of the establishment and the system has been accomplished, the leading organs should quickly carry out measures to solve the problems of having "acquired imbalances." If each branch of the armed services starts out from the goal of carrying out combined training of units well and uniformly arranges training, a relatively perfect combined training plan can be realized. After the leading organs have been "combined," then the business of combining the troops will be easy.

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DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS RECEIVE SECURITY BRIEFING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 7 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Sun Xuanquan [1327 6693 0356]: "Old Veterans of the Sixth Company Receive Security Education"]

[Text] On the afternoon of 19 November, the Sixth Company of a certain anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the Shenyang troops conducted a security education class for old soldiers about to be discharged and become veterans. Political instructor Cui Dejun [1508 1795 0193] instructed those present to learn [security rules] in order to improve understanding of guarding secrets. Then he asked the old veteran soldiers to observe three requests: 1) Everyone must check his personal belongings to erase and destroy documents and diaries showing troop designations and involving secrets of the units. 2) All materials and military books that carry a secrecy classification must be returned to the company and units. 3) After returning home, there must be no talk about the secrets of the units. With such work, chance of any secrets being leaked has been solved in time.

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GUIDED MISSILE UNIT COMPILES NEW TRAINING MATERIAL

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Xu Bin [1775] and Ouyang Shigao [2962-7122 2514 7559]: "Guided Missile Unit Headquarters Compiles New Training Material; 23 Comrades Participating in the Compilation and Writing Receive Awards"]

[Text] The guided missile unit headquarters recently compiled a set of new technical training materials of over 1,400,000 words.

So that the units would have a whole set of training materials to carry out drill and training, at the beginning of the year the guided missile unit headquarters assigned 60 special technical backbone members to organize a training materials compilation and writing group. For the training materials to be systematic and complete and to have a definite scientific and technical standard and also to be easily understood, many times they sent people to the units that designed and manufactured this type of guided missiles to learn and to seek opinions on the compilation and writing of the training materials. During compilation and writing, there was a shortage of technical data. They contacted concerned units and gathered, copied, arranged, compiled and wrote down the data. They also paid attention to including scientific and research achievements of the research and development and experimental units and the past training experience of the troops in the new training materials. The new training materials emphasized operation and use as well as basic theory. Among the comrades participating in the compilation and writing work, there were 23 comrades who made outstanding achievements who were given awards by the leading organs.

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